Wright State University

CORE Scholar
International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology - 2005

International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology

2005

Cognitive Systems Engineering Approach to Shared Situation
Awareness for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Matthijs Amelink
Max Mulder
Rene van Paassen
John Flach
Wright State University - Main Campus, john.flach@wright.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2005
Part of the Other Psychiatry and Psychology Commons

Repository Citation
Amelink, M., Mulder, M., Paassen, R. v., & Flach, J. (2005). Cognitive Systems Engineering Approach to
Shared Situation Awareness for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. 2005 International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology, 7-13.
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2005/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the International Symposium on Aviation Psychology at
CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Symposium on Aviation Psychology - 2005 by an
authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu.

COGNITIVE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH TO SHARED SITUATION AWARENESS
FOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Matthijs Amelink
Decis lab
Delft, the Netherlands
Max Mulder & M.M. (René) van Paassen
Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Aerospace Engineering, Control and Simulation Division
Delft, the Netherlands
John Flach
Wright State University, department of Psychology
Dayton, Ohio
Integration of UAVs with Air Traffic Control (ATC) is a world wide problem. ATC is already troubled by capacity
problems due to a vast amount of air traffic. In the future when large numbers of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) will participate in the same airspace, the situation cannot afford to have UAVs that need special attention.
Regulations for UAV flights in civil airspace are still being developed but it is expected that authorities will require
UAVs to operate “like manned aircraft”. The implication is that UAVs need to become full participants of a
complex socio-technical environment and need to generate ‘man like’ decisions and behavior. In order to deal with
the complexity a novel approach to developing UAV autonomy is needed, aimed to create an environment that
fosters shared situation awareness between the UAVs, pilots and controllers. The underlying principle is to develop
an understanding of the work domain that can be shared between people and UAVs. A powerful framework to
represent the meaningful structure of the environment is Rasmussen’s abstraction hierarchy. This paper proposes
that autonomous UAVs can base their reasoning, decisions and actions on the abstraction hierarchy framework and
communicate about their goals and intentions with human operators. It is hypothesized that the properties of the
framework can create ‘shared situation awareness’ between the artificial and human operators despite the
differences in their internal workings.
Introduction
There now seems little doubt that UAVs will be part
of civil aviation’s future infrastructure. UAVs are
Unmanned Aerial vehicles that are either remotely
controlled from a base station or are autonomous.
Ground control of the UAV varies from stick and
rudder control, to performing navigation task to
mission execution by the press of a button.
The military has been using UAVs for a variety of
purposes. Their missions have been characterized as
the “dull, dangerous and dirty” – missions that human
pilots would typically not want to fly or are not
suitable to fly. There are also plenty of these missions
on the commercial civil side and include
environmental and geological surveys, weather
reporting, search and rescue, forest-fire monitoring,
border patrol and communications relaying.
(Reynish, 2004)
Most UAVs are designed to fly their mission below
40,000 feet in controlled airspace, which is airspace
already heavily populated by manned aircraft. In
order to carry out these missions UAVs must be able
to fly among conventional air traffic without

demanding special handling by ATC. This would
have an unacceptable impact on ATC workload and
airspace capacity.
Although military UAV markets have been steadily
growing, civil UAV applications have been slow to
take advantage of potential applications. The slow
start is, at least partially, due to the lack of a
regulatory framework. Existing regulations cannot
accommodate civil UAVs. A regulatory framework is
being developed to ensure safety of UAV operations
and allow seamless integration in national and
international airspace. There are various initiatives
world wide that aim to develop regulations; often
they are partnerships between government and
industry. Two examples are UVS-International
initiated in Europe and Access Five in the United
States. Despite the current lack of regulations, it is
expected that regulatory authorities worldwide will
require UAVs to operate identically to manned
aircraft in civil controlled airspace (Avionics
Magazine, October 2004). This is a major challenge
UAV system design.
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Concept UAV Regulations
Europe’s UAV Task Force is a joint JAA /
EUROCONTROL initiative to commence work
leading to European regulations for civil UAVs. In
May 2004 the UAV Task Force delivered: A concept
for European regulations for civil unmanned aerial
vehicles. In this report three of the guidelines that
have been established during the development of the
regulation stand out with respect to this research.
They are repeated here shortly:
Fairness: Any regulatory system must provide fair,
consistent and equitable treatment of all those it
seeks to regulate.
Equivalence: Regulatory standards should be set to
be no less demanding than those currently applied to
comparable manned aircraft nor should they penalize
UAV Systems by requiring compliance with higher
standards simply because technology permits. UAV
operations shall not increase the risk to other
airspace users or third parties. UAV operators
should seek to operate within existing arrangements.
Transparency: The provisions of an Air Traffic Service
(ARS) to a UAV must be transparent to the Air Traffic
Control (ATC) controller and other airspace users. (…)
UAVs must be able to comply with ATC instructions and
with the equipment requirements applicable to the class
of airspace within which they intend to operate.

All UAVs have to meet the regulations whether the
UAV is autonomous or piloted from the ground.
Those UAVs that depend on a communication link
for control are sensitive to failure of that link. Failure
may be due to e.g., atmospheric disturbances,
hijacking attempts, jamming or tactical maneuvering.
In any case in civil airspace, the UAV must ensure its
safety and that of the other airspace users. How
regulation will precisely deal with this mode of
failure is unclear but it has been suggested that every
UAV will need an autonomous mode that is capable
of sense and avoid to ensure safety (Airspace
Integration plan, 2004; UAV Task Force 2004). In
the next paragraph the problems associated with
developing UAV autonomy are addressed.
Another obstacle, and technological challenge, is that
present UAVs cannot yet detect manned aircraft and
conflict situations. Therefore they cannot safely share
airspace with manned aircraft. To become accepted
in civil airspace, UAVs need to have the capability to
‘sense and avoid’ other aircraft in their operating
environment with the same level of safety as human
pilots. This problem will also be addressed in the
next paragraphs.
Problem Formulation

The U.S. Department of Defense faces the problem
of enabling their military UAVs to fly in civil
airspace. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has
provided the Airspace Integration Plan for
Unmanned aviation (2004). Two of the principles
guiding their approach are repeated here:

In the air traffic domain rules, procedures and
regulations have centered on the way humans
communicate and on human cognitive capabilities.
The focus of the problem is on how human operators
communicate about the meaning in the domain and
build their situation awareness. For autonomous
UAVs to effectively behave like manned aircraft,
they need to be able to communicate about the same
meaning and therefore share the same kind of
situation awareness with human operators.

Do no harm: avoid new initiatives that would
adversely impact air traffic control procedures and
manned aviation.

There are three areas of interest with respect to UAV
behavior. To be a full participant in the airspace a
UAV must be:

Conform rather than create: avoid the creation of
dedicated UAV regulations as much as possible. The
goal is to achieve transparent flight operations in the
National Airspace System.

1. capable to sense and avoid other aircraft and
obstacles.
2. a full participant in the ATC environment
3. able to cope with unanticipated events

These guidelines and principles will have a great
impact on how future UAV Systems will be designed
to comply with the regulations internationally. For
the most part they indicate that UAVs should fit in
seamlessly with manned aviation and meet equivalent
levels of safety. Only time will tell, when the actual
regulations are enacted, how much room is left for
dedicated UAV regulations.

1. Sense and avoid A lot of emphasis is put on ‘sense
and avoid’ capability in the conceptual regulations
because it is an important capability of critical safety
concern. To us the term ‘sense and avoid’ seems
incomplete because it omits the decision process that
intermediates ‘sense’ and ‘avoid’. Assuming that
obstacles and other aircraft can be sensed, the weight
of the problem is in deciding what action to take. Part
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of this process is assessing the situation and possibly
negotiating a solution. Situation awareness plays an
important role in this and the ‘sense and avoid’
capability is therefore seen as an integrated part of
the overall autonomy and decision making
architecture of the UAV.
2. Full participation in the ATC environment
Controlled airspace is a complex socio-technical
environment that is shared by many people that
contribute to the system and are interdependent for
function and safety. UAVs should become part of this
environment and therefore integrating UAVs with
existing ATC is not a matter of programming the
optimal solutions for the problem but instead it is a
matter of finding best human practice. A purely
technological solution alone will not address the full
scope of the integration problem; hence human factors
is a core element of the UAV integration process.
Communication is the most important interface
between the UAV and the ATC environment. It
allows parties to share information, express intentions
and resolve conflicts. It is unlikely that UAVs will
communicate through speech but it will need to be
able to use the concepts used in ATC and understand
their meaning. How a UAV can understand meaning
is related to how it can have situation awareness.
3. Unanticipated events This topic is left untouched
by the concept regulations. It is the area where CSE
is thought to have its major contribution. In the
Airspace Integration Plan (2004) for unmanned
aviation it is suggested that “Preprogrammed
decision trees are built to address each possible
failure during each part of the mission” (airspace
Integration plan for unmanned aviation, office of the
secretary of defense, 2004). Although this technique
will cover a lot of failure modes in possibly a very
effective way, there will always be some failures that
were not anticipated by the designers. To ensure an
equal level of safety as manned flight, UAVs need to
be able to effectively cope with unanticipated events.
To improvise and come up with new solutions to new
problems requires an understanding of the structure
of the work domain. The UAV needs to have this
understanding / awareness.
A Domain Representation for UAVs
The difficult question is: “how to create machine
situation awareness that is compatible with human
situation awareness?” The answer lays in how the
domain is represented internally: the UAV’s mental
model of the work domain has to be compatible with
how human operators think of the work domain. The

internal model will also determine the UAV’s
capabilities of dealing with the environment. We
believe that part of the solution is in how people
make abstractions in their work domain and that the
properties of Rasmussen’s abstraction hierarchy
(Rasmussen, Peijtersen, and Goodstein, 1994) are
central to this approach. To satisfy the requirements
pointed out earlier, the abstraction hierarchy is
proposed as the basis for the domain representation
for autonomous UAVs.
The abstraction hierarchy is proposed as the basis for
a domain representation mainly because its properties
that are important to work domain analysis are also
important for the intended domain representation. As
described by Vicente (1999), the first important
property is the psychologically useful way it
represents complex work domains. The second
important property is that it provides an informational
basis for coping with unanticipated events. Both are
shortly discussed below.
Psychological relevance The abstraction hierarchy
consists of multiple domain representations on
different levels of abstractions that are linked through
functional means-ends relations. This type of
hierarchy is explicitly purpose oriented and allows
operators to deal with complexity effectively. Each
level describes the domain but moving up the levels
there is less detail and more purpose and meaning.
Thus the top level describes the domain’s functional
goals which are usually abstract and the lowest level
describes the physical implementation. For the air
traffic domain you will find abstract terms like traffic
flows, safety, and efficiency in the upper levels and
more concrete terms like flight path, aircraft, and
engine in the lower levels. Note that the abstraction
hierarchy intended here covers the air traffic domain
and not only the UAV system.
The abstraction hierarchy connects the elements of
the work domain in means-ends manner so that they
can be seen in relation to what their meaning is. This
is the property that allows goal oriented problem
solving. The problem solving itself is constrained to
that which is relevant by starting on a high level of
abstraction, moving down only concentrating on the
subset of the domain that is connected to the function
of interest. This allows for computationally economic
problem solving (Vicente and Rasmussen, 1992)
which is important to all resources limited agents.
To be transparent UAV decisions and actions should be
based on a domain representation similar to that of the
human operators. A domain representation is needed
that is compatible with human thinking. The

9

psychological relevance of the abstraction hierarchy has
this implication. If the abstraction hierarchy is indeed
psychologically relevant and people do reason within an
abstraction hierarchy representation, it can form the
common language in a socio-technical system. In other
words; when a domain representation that is based on
the abstraction hierarchy is successfully implemented in
a UAV it should be able to deal with the domain
complexity in a goal oriented way and communicate
about the meaningful concepts in the domain. It should
generate behavior that is compatible with the human
way of dealing with the same problems. This is a first
step towards man-like behavior as will be required
by authorities.
Coping with unanticipated events Unanticipated
events are by definition not foreseen by designers.
Currently systems are not very good at dealing with
these events and they form a big threat to safety. In
ecological interface design (EID) the abstraction
hierarchy representation provides a basis for coping
with unanticipated events (Vicente and Rasmussen
1992). The abstraction hierarchy framework is used
because it captures the domain complexity while it
does not have built-in rules or procedures for dealing
with the complexity. The work domain is described
in terms of constraints that it imposes on the operator
and does not describe actions or tasks to deal with the
domain. When constraints are broken or not met,
which will happen when the actual behavior and
intended behavior differ, the representation provides
a framework for goal directed problem solving.
This is in contrast to programming decision trees that
address each possible failure during each part of the
mission, but leave the unanticipated events
unaccounted for. The abstraction hierarchy is
constrained based and not rule based thus attention
needs to shift from rule based reasoning to constraint
based reasoning. The idea is that in combination with
constraint based programming the representation can
be used to deal with situations that wouldn’t be
captured in a rule-based knowledge system. It can be
used to cope with unanticipated events.
As with EID, the abstraction hierarchy is used to
support knowledge based behavior. However, it is not
intended to engage in problem solving activity for
every encountered situation. Rule based and skill
based behavior can be much more computationally
effective to apply to known solutions. To make this
distinction the system will need to detect whether a
known solution will be effective or if it needs to
generate a new solution in a new situation. It is
hypothesized that the abstraction hierarchy
representation can support making this distinction.

Conclusion
The main benefit of developing this architecture is
the psychological relevance it has. It is a
representation compatible with human problem
solving. The work domain is represented in a way
that is similar to the mental model of the human
operators. When the architecture is based on such a
representation it is expected that the UAV will
behave according to human expectations and become
compatible with human interaction. The immediate
benefits are that the abstraction hierarchy:
•
•
•
•

provides a psychologically valid representation
for goal directed problem solving.
forms a common language for agents in a sociotechnical domain.
provides an informational basis for coping with
unanticipated events.
supports computationally economic problem
solving.
Situation Awareness for UAVs

The next important question is: “what is situation
awareness in a machine?” It is an interesting question
because there is not a clear answer to what situation
awareness is in a person. Before successfully
integrating manned and unmanned flight it is
necessary to have some understanding of how a
machine can be aware of its situation and what that
means. This paragraph is the result of a first
assessment and explains what is though to be a useful
path that will lead to UAV situation awareness.
The notion of situation awareness is hard to grasp, it
is not tangible and at times seems to describe itself.
As pointed out by Flach, Mulder and van Paassen
(2004) it is important that we don’t slip into using the
description of the phenomenon as an explanation of
the phenomenon.
To come more to grips with the concept of machine
SA a comparison is drawn with the concept of safety.
Safety is an important property of many systems we
build, especially aircraft. Aircraft that are unsafe are
not allowed to fly. It is a well defined property of the
aircraft (by regulations) but nowhere can a
component, a subsystem, a process or any ‘box’ be
found in an aircraft that is labeled ‘safety’. This is
because safety is an aggregation of the properties of
the components and their interactions. Safety has an
abstract meaning and is not directly observable.
When designing situation awareness the designer
should not aim for building a box or a process that can
be labeled ‘situation awareness’. A UAV’s situation
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awareness is, like safety, an aggregation of system
properties, processes and their relation to the actual
situation. It is reflected by the system’s interactions
with the environment, thus how it deals with the
situation. The first step the designer should focus on is
building an architecture for the system that allows it to
understand the situation. Our first step is the domain
representation as proposed in this paper.
Flach et al. (2004) state that an understanding of what
is meant by the term ‘situation’ is essential for any
progress toward a coherent theory of SA. The
abstraction hierarchy is considered as a description of
how experts organize or chunk complex information.
In the same sense designing an understanding of the
situation in the work domain is needed for any
progress towards designing SA. And the abstraction
hierarchy is proposed as a domain representation for
understanding the situation; a means for the designer
to chunk complex information in a way that is
compatible with human reasoning.
Shared Situation Awareness
The term ‘shared situation awareness’ is used here to
describe the capability of UAV, pilots and other
operators to share their situation awareness. The
importance of shared situation awareness to automation
is discussed in relation to collision avoidance. Collision
avoidance is very important for UAV operations
because collision avoidance (sense and avoid) capability
needs to be demonstrated before UAVs are allowed to
fly in civil airspace. That the matter is more complicated
than equipping UAVs with a Traffic Collision and
Avoidance System (TCAS) is illustrated by what is
referred to as the Ueberlingen midair collision. Nunes
and Laursen (2004) describe the events of that night and
identify a number of contributing factors, ranging from
system malfunctions to human factors issues that took
the safety redundancy out of the system. Under such
circumstances it can be anticipated that some errors
remain uncaught but what is striking is that TCAS, a
system designed as a last safety measure to resolve a
traffic conflict when all else failed, was unable to
prevent a fatal accident. On board commercial jets
TCAS interrogates the transponders of nearby aircraft.
When a possible collision is detected one pilot is told to
climb and the other to descend and thereby resolve the
conflict. However, according to Nunes and Laurson
(2004) TCAS itself was a contributing factor that led to
the accident.
The Ueberlingen Accident
On the night of the 1st of July 2002 a midair collision
took place above Lake Constance, Germany. The

collision involved a Boeing 757 en route from
Bergamo to Brussels and a Tupolev-154 that was
flying form Munich to Barcelona. Both aircraft were
equipped with the Traffic Collision Avoidance
System (TCAS). The aircraft flew at the same
altitude (FL 360) and their trajectories intersected at
an angle of 90 degree above Lake Constance, they
were on a collision course. Just seconds before TCAS
gave both pilots a resolution advisory the air traffic
controller at the Zurich Area Control Center
contacted the T-154 and instructed the pilot to
descend to FL 350 to avoid collision. Seconds later,
TCAS detected the possible collision and instructed
the Tupolev pilot to climb and the Boeing pilot to
descend. The Russian Tupolev pilot received
conflicting commands and decided to obey the air
traffic controller and to ignore TCAS. The Tupoloev
descended to FL 350 where it collided with the
Boeing that had followed the TCAS advisory and
also descended to FL 350. All 71 people were killed.
TCAS conflict resolution is based on the assumption
that both involved aircraft actually follow the
resolution advisory. Free interpretation of the TCAS
is incompatible with TCAS philosophy because it
does not account for situations where one aircraft
does not follow instructions as was the case in the
Ueberlingen accident.
When there is a conflict between ATC and TCAS,
European pilots are advised to follow the TCAS
advisory. In contrast Russian pilots are trained to take
both the ATC commands and TCAS advisory into
account before making a decision. The British pilot of
the B757 followed TCAS and descended to FL 350,
and the Russian pilot of the T154 chose to ignore
TCAS and follow the ATC command to descend to FL
350 as well. Why the Russian pilot took this decision
at that time will remain unknown but it does point out
that there must be arguments for pilots to assume that
ATC is in control and has priority over TCAS. The
fact that the Russian pilot had not contacted the air
traffic controller about the conflicting commands
suggests that these arguments might be quite strong. If
it is indeed the case that pilots can have good reasons
to believe that they should not obey TCAS the
assumption that all aircraft follow the traffic
resolution becomes unreliable. Unreliable because the
parties involved based their situation awareness on
different assumptions.
The air traffic controller did not know that the given
command to descend was in conflict with the
resolution advisory that TCAS issued seconds later.
The Russian pilot in the T-154 probably thought that
the air traffic controller was resolving the conflict
and decided to obey the controllers command without
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confirming this. The British B757 did what made the
most sense to him to avoid a possible collision and
followed the TCAS advisory. The assumptions they
made, made sense to their own understanding of the
situation but were incompatible with one another.
The described TCAS problems can be translated into
a lack of shared situation awareness as a contributing
factor. What the TCAS contribution to the accident
points out is that the situation awareness of one
airspace user is not enough. The situation must be
shared by all involved parties, they must have the
same understanding of the situation and work
domain; they must share situation awareness.
With respect to TCAS, improvements could be made
to make sure that the controller has the same
information as the pilots when a TCAS alert is
triggered. One way of doing this could be to
automatically inform ATC that a conflict is detected
and that what advisories have been issued.
California Crisis
The above story cannot really be told without telling
about how TCAS saved the day in a potential disaster
unfolding in the southwestern U.S. skies on Tuesday
14th of September, 2004. The crisis occurred at the
Los Angeles Air Route traffic Control Center in
Palmdale California at around 5 pm. The center that
is responsible for aircraft flying above 13000 feet
suddenly lost contact with all 400 aircraft in 460 000
square kilometers of airspace over California and
parts of Arizona, Nevada and Utah including the busy
McCarren International airport in Las Vegas
(Geppert, 2004). The cause was a software bug and
left aircraft in the area without ATC guidance to keep
them separated. Quick thinking controllers used
mobile phones to alert other traffic control centers
and the airlines that their aircraft were on a collision
course but the real life saver was TCAS. Commercial
jet pilots were able to avoid collisions by following
the issued TCAS advisories. That evening no
collisions took place despite the large number of
aircraft involved.
This incident shows us that communication does not
by definition enhance shared situation awareness. In
this event the lack of communication gave the pilots
no other choice but to rely on the TCAS resolution
advisories for collision avoidance.
Given the
situation it was safe for pilots to assume that the other
involved pilots relied on TCAS for collision
avoidance as well and that it was their highest
priority. The lack of communication made all pilots
assume the same thing about their situation which

resulted in a high degree of shared situation
awareness and the safety of 400 airplanes.
Discussion and Future Work
The problem of UAV integration is a much larger
problem than just fitting UAVs with clever ‘sense and
avoid’ equipment. Because UAVs will be required to
operate like manned aircraft, human factors is a core
element of the integration process. UAVs need to have
situation awareness like human pilots and they need to
be able to share their world understanding with people.
The abstraction hierarchy has been identified as a
valuable framework for representing the work domain
and the situation, i.e. the constraints shaping behavior.
It is hypothesized that the abstraction hierarchy as a
domain representation will form the basis for goal
directed problem solving and dealing with
unanticipated events.
Future research will focus on how the abstraction
hierarchy can be formalized into software and used to
reason about the world and engage in goal directed
problem solving activities. The representation will be
compatible with the human way of reasoning about the
work domain. It can form the common language
between multiple operators in the domain, including
human (actors) and artificial operators (agents). When
actors and agents make their decisions based on the
same goal directed representation of the work domain
they will be able to understand each other’s behavior
despite their different internal workings. Eventually
this should lead to shared situation awareness which is
a state in which multiple operators (artificial and
human) have a great deal of similarity between their
understandings of the situation.
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